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LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE STARE DECISIS
Mark Tushnet*
INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines practices in the legislative and executive
branches that are similar to the practice of stare decisis in the judicial
branch.' Stare decisis-like practices have several justifications, of
which three are relevant here.2
First, stare decisis conserves decisionmaking energy.3 In a large
number of situations, a person-judge or legislator-who considers a
© 2008 Mark Tushnet. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I was aided
immeasurably in developing my thoughts on this topic by a conversation with
participants in an informal roundtable at Harvard Law School and by comments from
Richard Fallon.
I This Essay is largely descriptive and exploratory, attempting to identify stare
decisis-like practices and pulling together observations that have not to my knowl-
edge been seen as related.
2 Two aspects of the judicial practice of stare decisis are irrelevant here. (1) In
the courts, stare decisis is an interpretive practice: a court asks what a prior court
decision means and, having determined its meaning, asks whether the decision
should be followed. Legislative stare decisis is not interpretive; executive stare decisis
may be, but its interpretive aspect has the same features as that of the judicial prac-
tice, which is the subject of an enormous amount of literature (about determining a
precedent's ratio decidendi, about the proper grounds for distinguishing a prece-
dent, and the like). (2) Sometimes the judicial practice of stare decisis is justified as
an essential aspect of the rule of law, as the rule of law is institutionalized in courts. It
seems obvious to me that stare decisis is not an essential aspect of the rule of law
generally: legislatures can radically change the law or repeal entire bodies of law with-
out offending rule-of-law principles. The rule-of-lawjustification of stare decisis there-
fore must be confined to the judicial practice. Put another way, for courts stare
decisis is a norm, while for legislatures and executive officials it is not. Nonetheless,
because the judicial norm rests in part on efficiency reasons, there is a partial analogy
between the practices in all three branches.
3 The efficiency justification for stare decisis demonstrates that discussions of
stare decisis should not start from the proposition that a decisionmaker has con-
cluded that a prior decision was mistaken and then examine whether or when the
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legal or policy question "from the ground up" will reach the same
conclusion as those who have already considered the question.
Rather than rethinking the question and coming to the same conclu-
sion that everyone else has, the decisionmaker can simply take what
others have concluded as a predicate for the decision at hand.
Second, stare decisis helps decisionmakers coordinate their
action by providing a "focal point" for action.4 Some problems have
multiple equilibria-solutions equally acceptable to all participants.
Arguing over which one to choose is pointless and costly. Deci-
sionmakers can avoid such arguments by choosing the one that
worked before.5
Finally, stare decisis also encourages an appropriate humility in
decisionmakers about their own capacity to arrive at correct deci-
sions. 6 Suppose one thinks through a problem from the ground up
and reaches a conclusion, then observes that others have engaged in
the same process and reached a different conclusion. One might
then think it reasonable to reexamine one's own reasoning-itself an
expenditure of decisionmaking energy-to see whether one's reason-
ing went off track somewhere. Legislatures (and legislators) and exec-
decisionmaker justifiably rejects the prior decision. The point of stare decisis, in its
efficiency aspect, is to keep the decisionmaker from asking whether the prior decision
was correct or mistaken. In a sense, stare decisis is an "exclusionary" practice, in
Joseph Raz's sense: the mere fact that a prior decisionmaker has arrived at a conclu-
sion blocks inquiry into whether that decision was correct or mistaken. See JOSEPH
RAz, P.AcTicAL REASON AND NoRms 39 (1999) ("A second-order reason is any reason
to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason. An exclusionary reason is a
second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason.").
4 The "focal point" idea was introduced in THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STrTEG
OF CONFLICT 57-58 (1980).
5 I should report that conversations have convinced me that it is quite difficult to
maintain a tight focus on only the efficiency and focal point reasons for judicial stare
decisis, with the effect that analogous efficiency-based legislative and executive prac-
tices are (mistakenly) dismissed as not truly involving stare decisis-like practices.
6 Sometimes the humility justification for stare decisis is escalated into a strong
epistemological claim based on Condorcet's Theorem: the mere fact that a prior deci-
sionmaker has reached a particular conclusion is a reason for believing that the con-
clusion is correct, if that decisionmaker is even slightly more likely than not to have
arrived at the correct answer (and the larger the number of decisionmakers who have
reached that conclusion independently-that is, among other things, without them-
selves relying on stare decisis-the stronger the reason for believing that the conclu-
sion is correct). My view is that invoking Condorcet's Theorem with respect to legal
conclusions involves a category mistake, and seeks to capture some of the benefits of
science for law's interpretive practices. For additional criticisms of the use of Condor-
cet's Theorem in this fashion, see Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism
and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1482, 1485-518 (2007).
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utive officials might be motivated by these same concerns to adopt
stare decisis-like practices, and I believe that they have.
This Essay sketches legislative and executive stare decisis with the
aim of raising questions about practices that have been underex-
amined, at least relative to the judicial practice.
I. LEGISLATIVE STARE DECISIS
Legislatures do have their precedents, memorialized in manuals
setting out the legislatures' rules and how they have been interpreted
over time. 7 My interest lies elsewhere-in practices connected to sub-
stantive legislation itself, which may be affected by, but are distinct
from, the legislature's internal rules of operation. First I discuss the
operation of legislative stare decisis in connection with legislation
already on the books, and then examine the operation of legislative
stare decisis as legislation proceeds through the enactment process. 8
A. Completed Legislation
A legislature might treat enacted legislation as constraining it for
two reasons. First, and most obviously, external constitutional con-
straints might preclude the legislature from revisiting what its prede-
cessor had done. This would be so, for example, when the prior
enactment creates vested rights in individuals, who might claim that
legislative revision of the enacted statute violates the constitutional
ban on impairing the obligation of contracts (or its analogue for the
7 See, e.g., 16 LEWIS DESCHLER & WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN, DESCHLER-BROWN
PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 94-661
(2002).
8 Any account of stare decisis must have a companion account of distinguishing
precedents. In an efficiency account, we would need to think about the costs of dis-
tinguishing. These costs include the actual effort needed to develop an explanation
for the departure from precedent and, probably more important, the risk that the
explanation will seem disingenuous to some relevant audience, that is, ginned up
merely to justify the action to be taken rather than to provide an honest account of
why the present situation is different from the prior one. For comments identifying
these costs of distinguishing, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 49
(2007) (observing that "[i]f the interpretive rules are loose, clever readings can nar-
row or distinguish inconvenient decisions after the fact"); Eric Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns 9 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 348, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002996 ("The 'civilizing force
of hypocrisy' makes it positively costly for decisionmakers to disavow a principle they
relied on to their benefit at an earlier time, although in some cases the benefits of
opportunistic disavowals of precedent are worth the cost.").
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national government, the Due Process Clause),9 or amounts to a tak-
ing of property without just compensation. 10
In some sense, the legislature has no choice about adhering to
existing law in these situations. 1 More interesting are situations in
which the legislature does have a choice, and chooses not to displace
existing law. To see the problem most clearly, consider a parliamen-
tary system with only two parties, and what occurs when legislative con-
trol shifts from one party to another. As a matter of pure political
power, the new majority could repeal all the laws its predecessor
enacted (with which the current majority disagreed, of course). But
that never happens. Indeed, and of more interest, sometimes the new
majority will not repeal or even amend legislation it opposed when it
was the minority party. Perhaps it opposed the legislation because it
believed that it would not work well. As the new majority, the party
might want to give the legislation a chance, to see if it does indeed
work well or badly.1 2 Or the new majority may have higher legislative
priorities. Were it possible to enact all its favored programs simultane-
ously, the new majority might repeal the statutes it opposed. That
being impossible, the majority will rank its legislative agenda, and a
law whose enactment it opposed might be relatively low on the prior-
ity list.
These two mechanisms show the efficiency benefits of legislative
stare decisis. The new majority conserves on legislative effort by
refraining from revisiting laws that might turn out to work well, or that
are relatively unimportant to it.13 We might test this account by exam-
ining a new majority's treatment of legislation it opposed while in the
9 Cf United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996) (holding preexist-
ing contracts enforceable against the United States government, notwithstanding
intervening legislation barring the government from honoring its agreements).
10 Cf Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001) (discussing the
effect on a Takings Clause claim of the existence of prior legislation limiting the prop-
erty owner's use of the affected property).
11 Sometimes it is claimed that stability as such is valuable, independent of consti-
tutional constraints and the cost of developing a new policy. In the judicial context,
the classic statement is from Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it
be settled right."). I am skeptical about this view, at least to the extent that it asserts
that an erroneous rule should be adhered to even when it is relatively easy to develop
a correct one.
12 And one can imagine this trial period lasting through the next election, in
which case-if the party then loses power-the legislation will stay on the books
.permanently."
13 This indicates another difference from the judicial practice. Courts do not
control their agendas as completely as legislatures do. An institution with greater
[VOL. 83:31342
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minority, and that it specifically criticized in its party platform, at least
when such platforms are routinely taken as laying out the legislative
agenda the party proposes to pursue if it wins the election.' 4 The
appropriations process provides another test: do legislatures-or,
more precisely, when do legislatures-take the prior year's appropria-
tion for a particular item or line as the presumptive appropriation for
the current year's? My sense is that the practice of doing so is wide-
spread, and that legislatures focus almost exclusively on new matters
within a particular line, but I do not know of any systematic study
focusing on this question.
B. Super-Statutes and Regular Statutes
The efficiency account of legislative stare decisis differs from
accounts of judicial stare decisis because it gives the prior decision no
particular normative weight (beyond the weight attached to simple
cost saving). Sometimes, though, enacted statutes are said to have
normative weight, such that modifications are generally undesirable
without an independent assessment of a specific modification's merits
unless it appears almost on the surface and without requiring much
analysis that the modification will improve the statute's operation.'
5
In addition, many statutes can serve as focal points for subsequent
legislation on related matters: rather than rethinking how some
generic issue should be addressed, legislators can start from the solu-
tion their predecessors found for some specific problem in the gen-
eral area and work outward.
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn describe some statutes as
"super-statutes." 16 For them,
agenda control may have less need for a stare decisis norm because keeping a matter
off the agenda functions to preserve the status quo in the way that stare decisis does.
14 This is the case with the party "manifestos" in Great Britain, for example. The
Labour Party's manifesto for the 1974 election, which it won, stated that a Labour
government would "repeal the Housing Finance Act," which would roll back rent
increases, and would "repeal the Industrial Relations Act as a matter of extreme
urgency." Labour Party General Election Manifesto February 1974, in LABOUR PARTY
GENERAL ELECTION MANIFESTOS, 1900-1997, at 183, 188-89 (lain Dale ed., 2000).
The latter was repealed by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1974. See
OTTO KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAw 204 (2d ed. 1977).
15 This formulation assumes that repealing the statute is out of the question, but,
with suitable adaptations, the analysis that follows would carry through with respect to
repeals as well.
16 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DuKE L.J. 1215,
1215-16 (2001).
2oo8] 1343
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[a] super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a
new normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2)
over time does "stick" in the public culture such that (3) the super-
statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad
effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four corners of
the statute.
17
Super-statutes have a "gravitational force,"' 8 a term that signals the
way in which super-statutes resemble precedents.
Consider laws regulating discrimination in employment as an
example of super-statutes) 9 When enacted, a particular antidis-
crimination law is an accommodation of competing interests: the
employee or potential employee's interest in a fair competition for
work, and the employer's interest in assembling a productive work
force. This accommodation may take the form of a broad nondiscrim-
ination norm coupled with provisions understood as exceptions to the
norm, such as a rule allowing employment practices that disparately
affect a protected class if the practice is justified by business necessity.
Over time, the super-statute loses its characteristic as an accommoda-
tion of competing interests, and comes to be understood as resting
solely on the norm of nondiscrimination, with the exceptions under-
stood to be mere concessions to political reality at the time of
enactment.
Super-statutes have a stare decisis-like effect, 20 and for normative
reasons-not the "rule of law" reasons typically offered to explain the
stare decisis effects of judicial decisions,2 1 but the norm that comes to
be taken as a super-statute's sole normative basis. This is clearest
when proposals for revising a super-statute are offered. 22 Proponents
17 Id. at 1216.
18 Id. at 1234.
19 My exposition of the idea of super-statutes differs in matters of detail from
Eskridge and Ferejohn's, but I believe that it is both faithful to their insight and an
improvement on their exposition.
20 Eskridge and Ferejohn are most interested in the stance courts should take
toward super-statutes. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 16, at 1246-63 (discussing
interpretive approaches in connection with super-statutes). I confess to some skepti-
cism about their treatment, which does not-in my view-really explain why the
purposivism they favor for super-statutes is inappropriate for all statutes.
21 See supra note 2.
22 Another indication is the way in which statutory revisions aimed at reversing
judicial interpretations of super-statutes are sometimes, perhaps often, presented.
The new statutes can be styled as "restoration" statutes, rather than mere corrections
of erroneous interpretations. An example is the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
20, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
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of revisions do not argue that the accommodation reached in the ini-
tial statute should be adjusted, but argue instead that the revisions will
do a better job of achieving the statute's (only) normative goal. The
revision, it is said, will reduce the incidence of employment discrimi-
nation, for example. Or, in connection with an environmental protec-
tion super-statute, the revision will lead to larger reductions in
environmental degradation, and more quickly, than the initial statute.
Super-statutes gain their status because they simultaneously
strengthen the constituency supporting their imputed sole normative
goal and weaken the constituency supporting the values accommo-
dated in the original statute. The former is strengthened when it is
able effectively to disseminate the view, both to its own members and
to the public generally, that the statute should be seen as deeply prin-
cipled rather than an accommodation of competing interests. 23 More
interesting, I believe, is the way in which a super-statute weakens the
other side. Supporters of what they present as the statute's sole nor-
mative goal get embedded within the side whose interests were accom-
modated in the original statute.24 Employers set up compliance
offices, which have an interest in advancing the nondiscrimination
norm or environmental protection even as they incidentally take the
company's business interests into account.2 5 Compliance offices can
disseminate support for the super-statute's imputed normative goal
within the company, thereby weakening the company's willingness to
treat that goal as merely one of several to be taken into account.
Regular statutes can also have stare decisis-like effects, basically
for efficiency reasons. Consider here a proposal to enact a statute
whose provisions could be enforced through direct actions in court or
by a new administrative agency.2 6 (For concreteness, suppose that the
23 This effect can be amplified if the constituency supporting the statute is able to
achieve legislative victories in relatively quick succession. Even a single victory, and
even more so a succession of victories, may demoralize the opposing constituency to
the point where it too comes to accept the normative desirability of the super-statute.
24 This distinguishes super-statues from at least some ordinary statutes, where the
"losing" constituency may face external enforcement but need not develop internal
bureaucratic structures to avoid liability. Needless to say, this is a matter of degree.
25 For studies of the role of compliance offices, see Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. Soc. 1589, 1609-15
(2001); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational
Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM.J. Soc. 1531, 1547-67 (1992).
26 The example was suggested by the discussion of the jurisdictional dispute over
lodging enforcement of some ERISA requirements in either the Department of Labor
or the Internal Revenue Service in JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT
SECURiTY AcT OF 1974, at 250-51 (2004), but is not derived from any specific example.
The jurisdictional dispute has too many details to be a useful expository vehicle.
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proposal deals with racial discrimination in employment.) Suppose
the choice of enforcement mechanism is highly contested at the time
of enactment, and that the reasons for each choice are reasonably
good and perhaps even in close balance. But, as it happens, the pro-
posal is assigned for committee processing to a committee headed by
a powerful legislator who believes that the administrative agency
mechanism is preferable. 27 The statute is then enacted, with enforce-
ment by the newly created administrative agency. Later two things
happen: the committee chair retires and is replaced by someone with
no strong views on the choice of enforcement mechanism, and a pro-
posal is made to extend the nondiscrimination ban to discrimination
on the basis of physical disability. Once again the question of enforce-
ment mechanism arises. Legislative stare decisis will almost certainly
incline the drafters simply to add the new provision to the existing
agency's workload.
Note that in the hypothesized situation the costs of choosing judi-
cial enforcement are relatively low, and the choice of agency enforce-
ment is not costless. The courts are already in place, so judicial
enforcement creates no net enforcement costs. 28 Drafting a provision
assigning enforcement to the courts will be more difficult than simply
inserting the words "on the basis of physical disability" into the
agency's existing mandate. But, on the other hand, an agency that
has been enforcing a ban on race discrimination in employment has
no particular expertise in disability discrimination. Still, agency
enforcement is, I believe, quite likely to be chosen.
The reason is that agency enforcement is "good enough." The
interest groups affected by the racial nondiscrimination provision
have found it acceptable, and-in the absence of pretty strong reasons
to think otherwise-legislators are likely to think that the interest
groups affected by the disability discrimination provision will find it
acceptable as well. And moving from one equilibrium to another,
even an equilibrium that might in the abstract be better, is costly. The
cost barrier need not be large, given the demands on legislators' time,
for the prior choice to be followed-which is precisely how legislative
stare decisis operates.
27 The committee chair's reasons for preferring the agency mechanism are irrele-
vant: they could be "merely" political, or the chair might be persuaded by the reasons
offered in support of the agency mechanism.
28 I assume that the cost of judicial enforcement is no greater than the cost of
agency enforcement.
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C. The Enactment Process
The phenomenon of interest here is this: there is often a long
period between the introduction of a legislative proposal and its adop-
tion-"long" here meaning a period over the course of which there
are several intervening elections and changes in the legislature's com-
position. (For expository purposes, assume that the proposal is for a
"liberal" reform.) The proposal's proponents negotiate over statutory
details at each legislative session and resolve some contentious issues.
So, for example, a proposal might have ten contentious provisions,
and negotiation over the first three produces a compromise in the
first legislative session. Then an election intervenes. Assume that the
proposal's proponents gain support in the election. 29 When the legis-
lature convenes next, the proposal's proponents take the first three
issues to be settled-this is what I refer to as legislative stare decisis-
and negotiate over the next two or three issues. After several elections
in which the proposal continues to gain support, the legislation is
enacted with the first three provisions being the ones negotiated and
compromised out in the first legislative session, the next two being the
ones negotiated and compromised out in the second, and so on down
the line.
Note the possibility that the legislation actually adopted could be
much less liberal than a parallel proposal introduced ab initio in the
final legislative session: the ten contentious issues might all be
resolved in the liberal direction by the final legislature, whereas legis-
lative stare decisis leads to the adoption of a statute with several less
liberal provisions in it. That is the puzzle of legislative stare decisis:
with the proposal having gained support in the intervening election,
why do its supporters refrain from reopening compromises already
reached?3 0
I have found it difficult to locate in the literature on how statutes
are adopted crisp examples of this form of legislative stare decisis.
Sometimes the accounts deal with enactments within a single legisla-
tive period. 3 1 Sometimes they deal with extremely complex statutes,
and the author focuses on the many moving parts rather than on a
29 The analysis is basically the same if the proponents lose ground, but the exposi-
tion would get both complicated and tedious, so I omit it here.
30 I put aside the possibility that in the first session compromises were reached to
avoid a veto and the increment of supporters in the second session is not large
enough to overcome a veto.
31 See, e.g., ERIc REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION (1973) (discussing the
enactment process for a statute introduced and adopted within a two-year period).
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particular provision as it gets modified.32 Still, one can glean some
hints from accounts that center on other matters. So, for example, it
seems to me that Kate Stith and Steve Koh's detailed presentation of
the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines statutes indi-
cates that the legislation became increasingly punitive and retributivist
at a rate slower than the rate at which Congress became increasingly
committed to a punitive and retributivist theory of sentencing. 33
Perhaps legislative stare decisis is an illusion. The second legisla-
ture can destabilize compromises already reached not by directly revi-
siting them, but by adopting new provisions that effectively reopen the
settled issues. Stith and Koh provide an example. 34 The sentencing
reform proposal that passed the Senate in 1978 provided that the sen-
tencing judge should "'consider. . . the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,"' and
directed the sentencing commission to consider the relevance of a
large number of personal characteristics in setting the guidelines.35
Two years later the proposal was amended. 36 Now the commission
was directed to ensure that the guidelines be "'entirely neutral as to
the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of
offenders,"' and that they "'reflect the general inappropriateness of
considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, fam-
ily ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.' 37
The 1978 provision survived, but, as Stith and Koh observe, the new
provisions certainly licensed, and perhaps encouraged, the commis-
sion to adopt guidelines that limited the sentencing judge's discretion
more substantially than the 1978 provision would have on its own.3 8
This is an example where legislative stare decisis may have operated
with respect to a particular provision but not with respect to the policy
embodied in that provision.
Legislative stare decisis might operate indirectly. Summarizing
interim developments in the enactment of the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,39 Professor Wooten
32 See, e.g., WOOTEN, supra note 26.
33 See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legis-
lative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993)
(examining the legislative history behind the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
34 See id. at 249-51.
35 Id. at 249 (quoting S. 1437, 95th Cong. § 101 (1978)).
36 See id. at 250.
37 Id. (quoting S. 1722, 96th Cong. § 125 (1980)).
38 See id. at 251.
39 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
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observes that the developments allowed the statute's proponents "to
secure legislation that included everything that had been in [the
immediately preceding version] and more." 40 The idea here is that
legislators do not use their enhanced political power to reopen settled
issues, but rather use it to obtain new provisions.
A first stab at an answer focuses on the legislature's median voter.
By assumption, the median voter's position has moved in the direc-
tion of support for the proposal. This might make compromises possi-
ble on issues that could not have been resolved in the first legislative
session, which would explain why the new legislature takes up new
issues. Unfortunately, though, the very same movement should make
it possible to reopen the old issues as well. The change in the legisla-
ture's composition does not explain the choice between moving on
and rethinking seemingly settled issues.
A second possibility is that the old and the new issues do not actu-
ally lie along the same dimension. That is, the new median voter
might support the proposal's enactment overall, but also prefer the
settled provisions to any alternatives because the former position rests
on a judgment about overall soundness while the second rests on a
judgment about something independent of overall soundness. 41
A third possibility is that the new legislature simply has limited
resources. Enacting the statute will require specifying an outcome for
all ten contentious issues. The time it takes to reopen and then
resolve settled issues cannot be devoted to resolving the remaining
unsettled ones.42 In this aspect legislative stare decisis serves effi-
ciency goals. 43
A final explanation for legislative stare decisis is norm-based.
Legislative stare decisis might be an expression of a reciprocity norm.
Legislators never know whether, with respect to any specific proposal
they favor, the median voter's position will move toward them or away
from them. Legislative stare decisis allows everyone to keep the bene-
40 WOOTEN, supra note 26, at 190.
41 For example, the median legislator might support some prison reform propos-
als because on balance they are good policy, but also might support some federalism-
related compromises reached in the prior session. The thought here is that the mer-
its of prison reform as such are independent of federalism-related concerns.
42 The resources might include political capital as well as time.
43 Initially, I had thought that this explanation could be supported by noting that
the prior compromise appeared to have been acceptable to the proponents' constitu-
ents in the first round, and so should be presumptively acceptable to them in the
second. On reflection, I think otherwise, largely because the shift in the median
voter's position means that the body of the constituents has changed, and the new
constituents might not think the prior compromise acceptable.
2008] 1349
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
fit of the gains they achieve in the first legislative session, no matter
what happens in the intervening election.
One additional point deserves note. Sometimes legislative stare
decisis might be perverse from the point of view of the proposal's sup-
porters in the short run. Suppose in the first legislative session one
relevant committee was controlled by a hardline opponent of the pro-
posal, whose views were substantially more conservative than that of
the median legislator in that session. To move the proposal through
this committee's "vetogate,' 44 the supporters made quite large conces-
sions, even though had it been possible to get a vote from the entire
legislature on the question at issue, the legislature would have sup-
ported a more liberal outcome. Now suppose that in the new legisla-
ture the prior committee chair was no longer in a position to block
the proposal's movement. 45 The prior compromise did not represent
the views of the first session's median legislator, much less that of the
current session's. For that reason, reopening the settled issue ought
not consume many legislative resources. I do not know whether legis-
lative stare decisis operates fully or in weak form in this setting; case
studies would be especially useful here.
II. EXECUTIVE STARE DECISIS
Stare decisis in the executive branch is a somewhat more
examined phenomenon, perhaps because it is practiced by agencies-
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC)-with which legal academics are more familiar. The basic
idea is straightforward: after a change in administration, these agen-
cies will reassert the positions taken in the prior administration, even
when the new administration's policy positions are significantly differ-
ent from those of the prior administration.46
44 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 677 n.13 (defining a vetogate as "a place within a process
where a statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed").
45 The chair might have lost the position because party control of the legislature
changed, because the chair retired or was defeated for reelection, or for many other
reasons.
46 I note that under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), the decision by an agency to interpret a statute differently from
the way in which the statute was interpreted under a prior administration receives
deference from the courts. See id. at 842-45. To that extent, executive stare decisis
properly has a smaller effect than judicial stare decisis. Note, though, that sometimes
the courts will insist on a decent substantive explanation by the agency for its change
of position, going beyond reference to the new administration's policy preferences.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983). That insistence can induce some degree of executive stare decisis, where the
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I suggest that the practice of executive stare decisis can be under-
stood by identifying these agencies' clients. They include the present
administration (and executive agencies within the administration),
"the law," and-for OLC-the office of the presidency. And impor-
tantly, they also include the courts-for the Solicitor General-and
other executive branch agencies-for OLC.
OLC's use of stare decisis in connection with the office of the
presidency is reasonably straightforward. When the client is identified
as an office, as distinct from the present occupant of the office, the
fact that the present occupant has particular views about the presi-
dency's legal and constitutional status and power is no more than a
tactical consideration, something OLC must deal with as it seeks to
define the status and power of the presidency as such.47 Otherwise
OLC takes itself and its predecessors as seeking to articulate principles
that transcend specific administrations, in just the way judges guided
by stare decisis see themselves and their predecessors as engaged in a
common enterprise.
Where the client is "the law," executive stare decisis is more com-
plicated. The reason is suggested by an analogy to the Chevron doc-
trine in administrative law. Justice Stevens' opinion in Chevron
concludes by noting that determining what the law means (in the
administrative law setting) implicates a combination of technical com-
petence and political responsiveness. 48 For agencies, the technical
competences are associated with substantive matters such as nuclear
power or occupational safety and health. For the Solicitor General
and OLC, technical competence lies in determining what the law is.
In a modestly post-legal realist world, the occupants of those offices
know that determining what the law is, is not merely a matter of techni-
cal competence. As in the Chevron context, what they say the law's
content is, is properly affected by the administration's policy views.
Why, though, is that content not fully determined by the adminis-
tration's policy views? That is, why is there some pull from the posi-
costs of explaining the change of are larger than the benefits (economic or political)
the new administration anticipates from changing position.
47 Conversations with those who have worked at OLC have persuaded me that
OLC's adherence to prior OLC interpretations does not vary significantly depending
on whether the question involved is one that is likely or unlikely to come before the
courts. OLC, that is, acts "as a court" for nonjusticeable questions, and in doing so
adheres to stare decisis.
48 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ('judges are not experts in the field, and are not part
of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile
competing political interests .... In contrast, an agency ... may ... properly rely
upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments.").
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tions taken by a prior administration with different policy views and,
therefore, with a different view of what the law is?
The answer, I suggest, lies in credibility. The legal views provided
to the Solicitor General and OLC can affect their audiences in the
courts and other executive branch agencies only if those views add
something to what the courts and the agencies could have come up
with on their own. Consider first executive branch agencies. 49 They
are under no obligation to seek the views of OLC about the lawfulness
of their policy initiatives.5 0 And, they can see themselves as just as
competent as anyone else at determining what the administration's
policy preferences are. They will seek out OLC's advice only if they
believe that OLC will provide them with a more disinterested view of
the law's content than they receive from within. Executive stare deci-
sis can provide the required assurance of disinterestedness.
In some ways the argument with respect to the Solicitor General
is even more straightforward. The Solicitor General offers views on
the law's content to the courts. But, after all, the courts themselves
are technical specialists in the law. In addition, even in a moderately
post-legal realist world where the courts acknowledge that policy
views shape the law, judges are unlikely to think that the policy views
of the present administration ought to carry any special weight (as
such) in defining the law's content.51 What, then, can the Solicitor
General provide the courts? He could provide a more efficient way of
getting into the law, particularly where the law is highly technical. But
judges will accept the efficiency gains only if they believe them to be
not undercut by an overly interested-that is, policy-driven-analysis.
Evidence that the Solicitor General practices executive stare deci-
sis so as to preserve the Office's credibility is of course hard to come
by. Credibility is a major theme in social scientific and journalistic
accounts of the Office, 52 but evidence beyond the anecdotal is essen-
49 My argument here reproduces that of Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 734 (2005)
("OLC ... inevitably faces clients urging constitutional interpretations most hospita-
ble to government. To the extent that the OLC successfully uses doctrinally based
arguments to resist those pressures, it exercises a court-derivative form of
independence . .. ").
50 They can, for example, rely entirely on the advice they receive from the agency
general counsel.
51 The parenthetical qualification is designed to signal the possibility that particu-
lar judges might have policy views that coincide with the views of the present
administration.
52 See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 7 (1987) ("Lawyers who have
worked in the SG's office like to say that the Solicitor General avoids a conflict
between his duty to the Executive Branch on the one hand, and his respect for Con-
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tially absent. The most widely reported instance of political interven-
tion modifying the Solicitor General's position occurred in the Bakke
case. 53 Solicitor General Wade McCree and his staff drafted an ami-
cus curiae brief arguing that the University of California's admission
policy was unconstitutional, but that better designed programs could
properly take race into account.54 After the briefs contents became
known to advocates of affirmative action and within the President's
cabinet, a discussion at a cabinet meeting led McCree to redraft the
brief to present a stronger argument favoring affirmative action pro-
grams.55 The controversy within the administration spilled over into
the press, so there is some possibility that some Justices knew of the
shifts in the administration's position.56 Yet, the Justices almost cer-
tainly had strong views on the merits of the case entirely independent
of what they heard from the administration, so identifying any signifi-
cant effects from what might have been characterized as a politicized
legal position seems impossible.
Catherine Sharkey reports another suggestive anecdote, in a less
highly charged setting and with some evidence that credibility actually
did matter.57 An important issue in food and drug law over the past
decade has been whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 58 preempts state common law causes of
action. 59 In 2000, during the Clinton administration, the United
States twice filed amicus briefs in lower courts taking the position that
gress or his deference to the Judiciary on the other, through a higher loyalty to the
law."); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL.
Scl. Q. 505, 509-10 (1998) (offering a skeptical view of the claim that the Solicitor
General is distinctively successful in the Supreme Court, but emphasizing the impor-
tance of the credibility of repeat litigators such as the Solicitor General).
53 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For accounts of the
controversy from various perspectives, see GRIFFIN B. BELL WITH RONALD J. OSTROW,
TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 29-32 (1982) (by the Attorney General at the time of the
controversy); JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., GOVERNING AMERICA 236-42 (1981) (by a cabi-
net member who strongly criticized McCree's original brief); JOEL DREYFuss &
CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE 162-71 (1979) (by a journalist and a
scholar).
54 See BELL WITH OSTROW, supra note 53, at 29-30.
55 See id. at 30-32.
56 See id. at 30.
57 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 151-54), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract= 1101448.
58 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
59 See Sharkey, supra note 57 (manuscript at 151-54).
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FIFRA did not preempt the claims at issue.60 In 2003, during the
Bush administration, the Solicitor General changed positions, saying
that it had "'properly reconsidered and disavowed its prior posi-
tion.' ,,61 Sharkey observes that the Supreme Court rejected the Solici-
tor General's position, specifically noting the Solicitor General's
changed position.62
Just as it is difficult to determine the weight of stare decisis in the
courts, so too for executive stare decisis-and largely for the same rea-
son: both judicial and executive stare decisis sensibly allow for depar-
tures when circumstances change. Even if we assume that a mere
change in administration is not one of the circumstances justifying
departures from stare decisis, such a change gives executive officials a
motivation for searching for, and finding credible, other grounds for
distinguishing their predecessors' views from the ones they assert
today. Still, depart too often or too far from what executive officials
have said the law requires, and executive officials are likely to find
relevant audiences increasingly skeptical about their claims that they
are saying what the law is, rather than merely putting into legal form
the current administration's policy positions.
III. CONCLUSION
The other contributions to this Symposium deal with stare decisis
outside the courts in terms framed by judicial opinions: What weight,
if any, should legislators and executive officials give to the constitu-
tional interpretations proffered by the courts? Does that weight vary
depending on circumstances or by constitutional issue? I hope to
have shown that the Symposium topic can profitably be considered
somewhat differently, by identifying some of the ways in which legisla-
tors and executive officials take as precedents legal interpretations
proffered by their own predecessors. I have also tried to sketch some
reasons for legislative and executive practices of stare decisis. It
60 See id. (manuscript at 153). The Solicitor General must approve the filing of
such amicus briefs. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(c) (2007) (stating that the "determin [ation]
whether a brief amicus curiae will be filed by the Government . . . in any appellate
court" is "assigned to, and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by, the Solicitor
General, in consultation with each agency or official concerned").
61 Sharkey, supra note 57 (manuscript at 154) (quoting Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (No. 03-388)).
62 See id. (manuscript at 152-54); see also Bates, 544 U.S. at 449 ("The notion that
FIFRA contains a nonambiguous command to pre-empt the types of tort claims that
parallel FIFRA's misbranding requirements is particularly dubious given that just five
years ago the United States advocated the interpretation that we adopt today.").
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should be clear, though, that my examination is no more than a pre-
liminary inquiry into a topic that, I believe, deserves more scholarly
attention.
1356 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:3
